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Chapter 12 
LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD WELFARE CASES INVOLVING 
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 
Frank E Vandervort, JD and Joshua B Kay, PhD, JD 
University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, US 
This chapter examines the legal framework applicable when child maltreatment and 
disability intersect. It begins with a brief description of the constitutional foundation for 
parent-child-state relations. It provides an overview of relevant federal child welfare 
laws, which today shape each state’s child protection system. It then considers the 
application of various federal laws governing work with children and families when a 
child has a disability. In doing so, we consider the Americans with Disabilities Act, the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
and we touch upon Social Security benefits for children. This chapter does not examine 
child well-being legislation that establishes and funds programs such as Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), or publicly funded health care for children such as the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program.  
INTRODUCTION 
According to the Census Bureau in the United States (US), approximately 2.8 million 
school-aged children (ages 5–17 years) have a disability (1). These disabilities range 
from physical to cognitive, sensory to emotional. Having a disability may place a child at 
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higher risk for maltreatment. In turn, maltreatment may cause a child to have a disability, 
such as when a child suffers from an inflicted head injury. Inevitably, children with 
disabilities will come into contact with the child protective system. Nationally each year, 
the confirmed cases of child maltreatment approach 1,000,000, which involve some 
3,000,000 children. Among these are hundreds of thousands of children with disabilities 
and maltreatment in the US who will be involved in disparate legal proceedings designed 
for one or the other, but not both.  
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Constitution of the United States does not explicitly mention parents, children or 
families. For nearly a century, though, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution 
to protect the rights of parents to raise their children and the rights of children to benefit 
from familial attachment free from interference by governmental authorities. At the same 
time, the Court has recognized a compelling governmental interest in protecting children 
from maltreatment at the hands of their parents, guardians or custodian. The 
establishment of these rights is rooted in the xenophobia surrounding World War I (2). 
Before the advent of World War I, most states in the country protected the right of 
parents to educate their children in the language of their choice. During that war, 
however, a number of states enacted legislation requiring that public school children be 
taught in English, and prohibited educational lessons taught in other languages. The State 
of Nebraska enacted one such law in April 1919, which “made it a misdemeanor to teach 
any subject in a foreign language, or any foreign language as a subject” (2). 
A year after the statute was enacted, a county attorney entered the classroom in 
Hampton, Nebraska, where Robert Meyer was teaching in German. Meyer was charged 
with violating the statute prohibiting the use of any foreign language when teaching 
school children. He was convicted of the misdemeanor and given the minimum fine 
provided by the law, $25. He appealed his conviction on grounds that the law prohibiting 
him from teaching in German violated his right to liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that “No state shall … deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” (3). The Nebraska 
Supreme Court upheld his conviction, and he appealed to the US Supreme Court.  
In 1923, the Court issued its opinion in the case. The Court acknowledged that it had 
“not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed” (3). However, the 
court noted, “Without doubt, it denotes . . . the right of the individual . . . to marry, 
establish a home and bring up children . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long 
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” 
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(3). Thus, the court observed, “it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children 
education suitable to their station in life” (3). Because the parents of Mr. Meyer’s 
students possessed this “natural duty,” they had a right, protected by the liberty clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to engage Mr. Meyer to fulfill this responsibility. Although 
the court recognized the State “may do much, go very far...in order to improve the quality 
of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally...the individual has certain fundamental 
rights which must be respected” (3).  
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), the Court held that the 
fundamental right established in Meyer extended to a parent’s right to choose to educate 
his or her children in non-public, religious or military schools (4). In doing so, the Court 
observed that “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and 
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations” (4). Together, the Meyer and Pierce cases established the 
fundamental right of a parent to direct the upbringing of his or her child without undue 
interference from governmental authorities. 
In both Meyer and Pierce, however, the Court made clear that State authorities are 
not entirely without power to regulate schools or, more broadly, parents’ choices in 
directing their children’s upbringing. The limitations on a parent’s right to direct their 
children’s upbringing were addressed in 1944. Massachusetts had enacted certain child 
labor laws, which prohibited children of certain ages from engaging in certain activities. 
Sarah Prince was charged with violating the law when she permitted her two children and 
a third child over whom she had legal guardianship to sell religious pamphlets for $.05 on 
the streets of Brockton, Massachusetts. She was convicted of violating the law and 
appealed.  
The case Prince v Massachusetts raised two issues related to the Constitutional right 
to liberty: 1) the right of a parent to direct a child’s religious development; and 2) the 
right of the children to observe and participate his or her family’s religious activities. In 
Prince, the Court more squarely articulated the sometimes adverse positions of the parent 
and the state vis-à-vis the child. The Court acknowledged both the parent’s interest in 
raising her or his child without governmental interference and the right of the State, as the 
ultimate guardian of the child, to act to protect the child’s welfare. The Court noted, “It is 
cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents” 
(5). But the Court went on to state that “the family is not beyond regulation in the public 
interest...neither the rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. 
Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well-being, the state...may restrict the 
parent’s control” in a number of ways, including by mandating school attendance and 
prohibiting child labor (5). Thus, the Court ruled, “the state has a wide range of power for 
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare” (5). 
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What of the rights of children relative to the rights of the state and the parents in this 
mix? The rights of children in this triangle of rights are somewhat less defined. Courts 
have, however, recognized that, generally speaking, parents and children have reciprocal 
rights. Parents have the right to raise their children as they see fit and children have the 
right to benefit from the day-to-day nurturing provided by parents and to their benevolent 
decision-making (6). That is, parents have the right to care, custody and control in raising 
of their children and children have the right to benefit from that care and concern. 
However, “the power of the parent...may be subject to limitation under Prince if it 
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a 
potential for significant social burdens” (7). 
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court has applied this basic doctrine balancing the 
rights of parents and the rights of state authorities to familial living arrangements (8), 
medical and mental health decision-making (6), and whether a grandparent has the right 
to visit a child over the objections of the custodial parent (9). The rule that pertains from 
the Court’s cases, read together, is that a fit parent, one who has not been found to have 
maltreated his or her child, has the right in the first instance to raise his or her child as he 
or she sees fit. Parents’ rights are weakest when they have been shown to have maltreated 
their child.  
 
 
CHILD MALTREATMENT AND  
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
 
The law begins with the presumption that a parent is fit and will, therefore, make 
parenting decisions that are in the best interests of her or his child. The Supreme Court 
has articulated the rationale for this presumption: “The law’s concept of the family rests 
on the presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience and 
capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions...[H]istorically, it has 
recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their 
children” (6). While the state may have a legitimate interest in separating a child from an 
abusive or neglectful (i.e., unfit) parent, the state has no legitimate interest in separating a 
child from a fit parent (10). 
When one wishes to invoke the law in order to protect a child from parental neglect 
or abuse, that individual must assume the burden of demonstrating parental unfitness. In 
asserting the unfitness of a parent to parent his or her child, the law will not rest on 
presumptions, and the actual unfitness of the parent must be demonstrated (10). Thus, for 
example, where the State of Illinois enacted a law that presumed that all unmarried 
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fathers were unfit to provide care and custody for their children upon the death of the 
child’s mother and automatically took the children into the foster care system, the Court 
held the law to be an unconstitutional violation of the father’s right to both equal 
protection of the law due process of law (10). Under the state’s statutory scheme, a 
mother, a married father or a divorced father had the right to have a hearing at which state 
authorities were required to demonstrate the parent’s unfitness before their children could 
be removed. The statute, however, allowed the state to remove children from their father 
if he had never married their mother on the theory that because most unwed fathers were 
unfit, the children of all these fathers could be removed. The Supreme Court struck down 
this law, requiring that state authorities demonstrate that the particular father at issue is 
unfit to care for his children.  
Cases involving the fathers of children present some unique legal challenges. While a 
child’s mother is known, and her rights established, at the time of birth, the identity of a 
child’s father may be more difficult to ascertain, and determination of his rights more 
complicated. In Lehr v. Robertson, the Supreme Court was required to define the rights of 
a father who was not married to the child’s mother and who had never established a 
relationship with his child (11). Because the father did not grasp the opportunity to parent 
his child, he did not have the same rights as a father who had grasped that opportunity. In 
short, a father must actually exercise his parental rights and attend to his parental 
responsibilities or he may be deprived of his rights more easily than a father who has 
asserted them.  
While parents and children possess reciprocal rights in their relationship with one 
another and share an interest in the preservation of their family free from governmental 
interference (12), there is no absolute constitutional right to remain together as a family, 
and state authorities, acting on the orders of a court, may remove a child from an abusive 
or neglectful parent’s custody (13). Once a state trial court finds that a parent is unfit, the 
State’s “urgent interest” in protecting the child from harm prevails over the parent’s right 
to care, custody and control of the child.  
While child protective services caseworkers may act to protect a child from harm by 
seeking to remove him from abusive or neglectful parents, the state is under no obligation 
to do so. Thus, where children’s protective services were involved with a family but 
failed to remove the child from the parent’s custody, the child could not successfully sue 
the state authorities after his father beat him causing extensive brain damage (13). 
While the state may demonstrate parental unfitness by a preponderance of the 
evidence standard (i.e., that child maltreatment more likely than not occurred), it may not 
permanently terminate a parent’s rights unless it can show by clear and convincing 
evidence that abuse or neglect has occurred (12). The Supreme Court has explained the 
need for this higher burden of proof: 
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The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and 
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model 
parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood 
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable 
destruction of their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their 
parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting 
state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened 
familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. (12) 
Note that this standard applies only to non-Indian children. A higher standard, 
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” applies to the termination of parental rights to an Indian 
child, as will be discussed more fully later in this chapter. While the Supreme Court has 
held that the Constitution does not require, as a matter of due process of law, that parents 
be appointed legal counsel in every case (15), most states, either in interpreting their 
constitutions (16) or by way of statutory enactment (17), provide for the appointment of a 
lawyer in every child protection proceeding at public expense if the parent is unable to 
afford one. Although appointment of legal counsel is not constitutionally required, the 
provision of a transcript of the trial court proceedings at public expense is mandatory if 
the parent is unable to afford to pay for the transcript to be produced (18). With this 
constitutional framework in mind, we will next consider the statutory schemes utilized by 
states to protect children from inadequate parenting. 
THE FEDERAL STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF CHILD WELFARE CASES 
Every state has a statutory scheme for responding to alleged child maltreatment that 
occurs at the hands of a child’s parents or legal custodians. (19) While these statutes 
differ in their particulars, they are substantially similar largely because of the federal 
government’s involvement in funding child protection services since the mid-1970s. To 
understand how this came to be, it will be helpful to begin with a very brief history 
lesson. 
The United States has always provided some mechanism by which the larger 
community can step in and assume the care of a child who is without parents or whose 
parents are unable or unwilling to provide an appropriate home. By the early 1800s, the 
doctrine of parens patriae—the notion that the sovereign was ultimately responsible for 
safeguarding the welfare of those who lacked legal capacity—was well-established in 
American law. Where children were placed when their parents were unable to provide 
and appropriate home has changed over time, from basically indenturing them to placing 
them in congregate care facilities, to foster family homes. 
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In the 1960s, in the wake of the publication of the Kempe et al. seminal paper “The 
battered child syndrome” in the Journal of the American Medical Association (20), states 
began to enact laws requiring physicians and other professionals to report cases of 
suspected child abuse to state authorities (21). Those laws were expanded over time to 
broaden both what was to be reported—e.g., child neglect and sexual abuse in addition to 
physical abuse—and categories of professionals who were mandated to report their 
concerns— initially only medical professionals were required to report, but that was 
expanded to social workers, teachers and others professionals who come into frequent 
contact with children. These laws resulted in substantial increases in the number of 
abused and neglected children coming to the attention of state child protection 
authorities. 
By the mid-1970s, there were about a half-million children in the foster care system 
nationwide. It was not unusual for children entering the foster care system to remain in 
the system for years with no effort being made either to reunify them with their families 
of origin or to move them into alternative permanent homes. This phenomenon came to 
be known as foster care “limbo” and was accompanied by another phenomenon, foster 
care “drift,” in which children would often move from home to home. Children remained 
in foster homes for so many years that the United States Supreme Court was called on in 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform to determine whether 
long-term foster families had the same or similar constitutional rights as biological 
families. Eventually, these concerns were brought to the attention of Congress, which 
enacted legislation intended to bring about reform of the nation’s child protection 
systems. Space limitations do not permit a detailed discussion of federal child welfare 
law.  
CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION AND TREATMENT ACT 
The United States is a federal system, which means that some matters of public policy are 
handled by the federal government while others are handled by the individual states. 
Legal issues relating to families are regulated by the states. The federal government may 
influence state policy by enacting legislation pursuant to its spending authority and 
placing conditions on the receipt of federal money. In the child protection arena, the 
federal government has established a stream of funding that allows the states to draw 
down large amounts of federal money if they design their state child protection systems 
to meet federal standards.  
The first such statute that Congress enacted was the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act (CAPTA). Signed into law in 1974, and repeatedly amended and 
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reauthorized since, CAPTA provides support for state systems of preventing and 
responding to reported cases of child maltreatment. CAPTA also provides funding to 
support research into all aspects of child maltreatment—causes, prevention, and 
consequences—as well as program evaluation and technical assistances to states, Indian 
tribes and non-profit organizations (22). 
ADOPTION ASSISTANCE AND CHILD WELFARE
ACT OF 1980 
Concerned about the number of children in foster care, the length of time they remained 
in what was intended to be a temporary system, and placement instability, in 1980, 
Congress passed and the President signed into law the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980. This statute added two sections to the Social Security Act to 
provide funding to states to address child protection. Broadly speaking, this statute, 
which, like CAPTA, has been amended and reauthorized repeatedly since its initial 
enactment, has three purposes: 1) reducing the number of children entering foster care; 2) 
shortening stays in foster care; and 3) moving children to permanent homes, either 
through return to their family of origin, or, when return home is not possible, moving 
children into adoptive homes. We will look at each of these goals in a bit more detail.  
To reduce the number of children entering foster care, the law required that state 
child welfare authorities make “reasonable efforts” to prevent children from entering the 
system by developing programs to provide in-home services to children and their families 
aimed at maintaining the family. To accomplish this, Congress added Title IV-B to the 
Social Security Act, which funnels federal money to states to prevent the removal of 
maltreated children from their homes. In response, states developed intensive family 
preservation programs which seek to address the family’s needs and problems in 
functioning in order that children may remain safely in their homes. 
Next, the statute addressed those cases in which the child cannot be safely maintained 
in the home and must be removed. To accomplish this, Congress created Title IV-E of the 
Social Security Act. The law incentivizes states to make “reasonable efforts” to return 
children to their families. To accomplish this goal, state child protection authorities are 
required to develop individualized case plans aimed at addressing the needs of individual 
family members such as drug or mental health treatment for parents and medical and 
mental health care for the children. The aim of the service plan is to resolve the problems 
in functioning that lead to the child’s removal and facilitate the safe return of the child to 
the custody of his or her parents. 
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The third requirement of the statute is that states consider “the child’s sense of time.” 
rather than adult’s sense of time. Generally, Congress determined that children need 
decisions about returning home or being freed for adoption to be made much more 
quickly than was happening before the enactment of the stature. Thus, the law required 
that states hold permanency planning hearings (PPH) after a child had been in foster care 
for a designated period of time. Originally, the PPH was to be held 18 months after the 
child entered foster care. That requirement was subsequently shortened to one year. 
Finally, the 1980 law provided a package of adoption incentives that were intended to 
move children from temporary foster care into permanent homes. These incentives 
include the state rather than the adoptive family paying for the costs of the adoption (e.g., 
court fees) and by providing both cash assistance and medical benefits for special needs 
children (e.g., children with disabilities and older children). 
In the early 1980s, these statutes began to have their intended impact, the numbers of 
children entering foster care edged down slightly. But then two phenomena converged to 
increase the numbers of children entering care. First, a more conservative federal 
government began to cut public benefits available to families, increasing the risk of child 
maltreatment. Secondly, the combination of the crack cocaine epidemic and the advent of 
HIV/AIDS had devastating impacts on certain communities. The need for foster care 
increased.  
A related problem also emerged. In the 1980 law, Congress never defined what it 
meant by “reasonable efforts,” and many states, in part as a means of saving money, 
defined it to mean every conceivable effort had to be made before a child could be 
removed from the home. That is, states began to overuse intensive family preservation 
programs beyond their capacities, which resulted in a number of high profile child deaths 
and many lesser harms inflicted on children (23). 
ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 
As a result, in 1997, Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the Adoption 
and Safe Families Act (ASFA), which was intended to clarify the intent of Congress 
regarding the 1980 Act in general and the “reasonable efforts” requirement in particular. 
While it renewed the federal government’s commitment to family preservation, it made 
clear that children’s health and safety are to be the paramount concerns of the nation’s 
child protection systems.  
The ASFA maintained the basic framework of the 1980 Act but made a number of 
adjustments and clarifications. The new law tightened the timeline for permanency 
planning hearings from 18 months to one year. It also made clear that there is a set of 
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cases involving very serious child maltreatment—e.g., death of a child, torture of a 
child—in which “reasonable efforts” shall not be made to preserve or reunify the family, 
and the state authorities are mandated to seek the termination of the parents’ rights 
immediately.  
Next, ASFA permitted each state to define for itself a category of “aggravated 
circumstances” cases in which state authorities may determine that “reasonable efforts” 
to either preserve or reunify a family are unnecessary, and thereby permit the child 
protection agency to pursue immediate termination of parental rights. While each state is 
free to define this group of cases for itself, the federal legislation suggests that 
appropriate circumstances for its use include abandonment, chronic abuse, and sexual 
abuse.  
The final major change in the law under ASFA is that the state child welfare agency 
may seek, and the juvenile or family court may grant, termination of parental rights in 
any case without making “reasonable efforts” to preserve or reunify the family if the 
specific circumstances warrant such action. Illinois is one state that has codified this 
possibility. It statute provides that parental rights may be terminated “in those extreme 
cases in which the parent’s incapacity to care for the child, combined with an extremely 
poor prognosis for treatment or rehabilitation, justifies expedited termination of parental 
rights” (24). 
In the wake of ASFA’s enactment a number of states have adopted definitions of 
“reasonable efforts” in order to guide state child welfare authorities and courts in making 
decisions about whether this requirement has been complied with. For instance, Missouri 
law provides as follows: 
“Reasonable efforts” means the exercise of reasonable diligence and care . . . to 
utilize all available services related to meeting the needs of the juvenile and the family. In 
determining reasonable efforts to be made and in making such reasonable efforts, the 
child’s present and ongoing health and safety shall be the paramount consideration. In 
support of its determination of whether reasonable efforts have been made, the court shall 
enter findings, including a brief description of what preventive or reunification efforts 
were made and why further efforts could or could not have prevented or shortened the 
separation of the family. The [state child welfare authorities] shall have the burden of 
demonstrating reasonable efforts. (25) 
ASFA also permitted the use of concurrent planning, which allows state child 
protection authorities to simultaneously seek to reunify the family and develop an 
alternative plan in the event that reunification services are not successful. By engaging in 
the duel planning process, children’s stays in foster care can be shortened and they can 
achieve permanency more quickly. The law also expanded permanency options to include 
both permanent legal guardianship and a designation called “another planned permanent 
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living arrangement,” which is typically used in cases of older foster children who can 
neither be returned to their families of origin nor placed for adoption, and includes 
alternatives such as independent living or, perhaps, discharge into the adult foster care 
system for incapacitated adults.  
 
 
MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT AND THE INTERETHNIC ADOPTION 
PROVISIONS 
 
Historically, minority children, particularly African Americans, were excluded from 
receiving public child welfare services. In more recent years, there has been concern not 
of underserving minority children but of the overrepresentation of minority — again, 
specifically African American — children in the child protection system. As a result, 
there has been debate about the availability of services to meet the needs of these 
children. One ongoing controversy is the placement of African American children across 
racial lines for adoption. One response to this concern was for state authorities to engage 
in conscious race matching. As a result, some African American children’s placement 
from institutional care into foster family homes or for adoption in a suitable home was 
delayed or denied. Some jurisdictions had explicit waiting periods before a child could be 
placed into or adopted across racial lines. 
In 1994, Congress enacted the Multiethnic Placement Act, which sought to eliminate 
(or, at least, dramatically reduce) the use of race, color or national origin as a basis on 
which foster or adoptive placement could be determined. The law’s language, however, 
was easily interpreted as permitting some racial matching, so two years later, Congress 
passed clarifying language in the Interethnic Adoption Provisions, which were intended 
to ban outright the use of race, color or national origin in placement decision-making 
except in the rarest of circumstances. 
If the placement of a child into either a foster or adoptive home is delayed or denied 
on the basis of race, color or national origin, the law explicitly provides that the 
aggrieved person—the child or the foster/adoptive parent—may sue the state child 
welfare agency. This is a rare exception to the governmental immunity from lawsuits 
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THE FOSTER CARE INDEPENDENCE ACT 
Each year, approximately 20,000 children age out of the foster care system. Many of 
these youth are ill-prepared to make a successful transition to young adulthood. 
Historically, most had not graduated from high school, many were ending up homeless, 
nearly half were themselves parents, and some 80% of them were unable to support 
themselves financially. To address the unique problems facing this sub-population of the 
foster care population, Congress enacted The Foster Care Independence Act in 1999, 
commonly known as the “Chafee Act,” so named for its author, Senator John Chafee 
(1922-1999).  
The Chafee Act provided a separate funding stream to states to allow them to develop 
programming for children who were in the foster care system on or after their 14th year 
birthday. In addition to providing Medicaid coverage for these youth until the age of 21 
years, the Act required that foster parents of these youth be specially trained to meet their 
needs and that state agencies assist youth in developing independent living skills such as 
how to seek employment and how to manage a household budget. Agencies were also to 
provide assistance with completing high school and making the transition to job training 
or college. The law also provided additional adoption subsidies to encourage and support 
the adoption of these older children. 
In 2008, the Congress amended Title IV-E to allow states to extend these youth in the 
foster care system until their 21st year birthday. It also mandated that state agencies 
develop a personalized, youth-directed plan for each youth in order to address the 
transition to adulthood, including educational, housing, health insurance, and other 
considerations.  
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT 
In 1978, in an effort to respond to overzealous child welfare practices aimed at 
assimilating Indian children into the dominant culture through unnecessary removals, 
Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Unlike the other federal child 
welfare laws discussed in this chapter, which are funding statutes, the ICWA is 
substantive law. That is, unlike the funding statues, which the states may choose to 
follow or not (if they choose not to, of course, they will not be able to draw down some 
or all of the federal funding they would be able to draw down if they complied), the states 
are mandated to comply with the ICWA in every child protection case involving an 
Legal issues in child welfare cases involving children … 225 
“Indian child.” This distinction results because the Constitution of the United States 
explicitly reserves to the Congress the authority to make laws relating to the Indian tribes. 
Two threshold issues are important to keep in mind regarding the application of the 
ICWA. First, the law defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under 
age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” 
The federal government has given formal recognition to 567 “tribal entities” across the 
country. Of note, it is possible for a child to be of Native American ancestry but not 
qualify as an “Indian child” within the meaning of the law, because each tribe defines for 
itself its tribal eligibility requirements. Some, but not all, tribes have a blood quantum 
requirement. Secondly, unlike child protection proceedings involving non-Indian 
children, in a proceeding involving an “Indian child” the child’s tribe is a party to the 
proceeding. Thus, the tribe or the parents may, generally speaking, elect to move the case 
from the state court to a tribal court. Alternatively, the tribe may intervene as a party to 
and participate in a state child protection proceeding. 
When an “Indian child” resides on a reservation, state courts may make only 
emergency orders that are necessary to ensure a child’s immediate safety. In situations 
such as this, the law provides that the case must be transferred the tribal court. Most 
tribes that have tribal courts have separate child welfare codes. However, these codes are 
substantially similar to state child welfare codes. As with state child protection systems, 
the various federal laws allow tribes to access federal funding to support their child 
protection efforts so long as the tribal system meets the federal requirements.  
The ICWA provides a unique set of procedures applicable to cases of Indian children 
that are explicitly intended to make it more difficult to remove an Indian child from his or 
her home. The law accomplishes this goal in several ways. First, it increases the amount 
of evidence (i.e., the standard of proof) which state authorities must present to a court 
before an Indian child may be removed from the home. While a non-Indian child may 
typically be removed from the home based upon a showing of probable cause that a child 
has been harmed, before an Indian child may be removed, the state authorities must 
present clear and convincing evidence. This is the same standard by which the parental 
rights of a non-Indian child’s parent may be permanently terminated. To terminate the 
rights of an Indian child’s parents requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest 
standard of proof known to the law, which is typically used to convict a defendant of a 
criminal offense.  
The ICWA also requires that at both the removal stage and the termination of 
parental rights stage in a child protection proceeding state authorities prove that “active 
efforts” have been made to maintain or reunify the Indian family. The Bureau of Indian 
Affairs within the Department of the Interior in 2015 issued updated guidance for state 
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authorities in applying the ICWA. (26) It said that, “Active efforts are intended primarily 
to maintain and reunite an Indian child with his or her family or tribal community and 
constitute more than reasonable efforts” as required by other federal funding legislation. 
The BIA provides examples of “active efforts,” including: 
 
 “Identifying appropriate services and helping the parents to overcome barriers, 
including actively assisting the parents in obtaining such services.” 
 “Taking into account the Indian child’s tribe’s prevailing social and cultural 
conditions and way of life, and requesting the assistance of representatives 
designated by the Indian child’s tribe with substantial knowledge of the 
prevailing social and cultural standards.” 
 “Offering and employing all available and culturally appropriate family 
preservation strategies.” 
 “Completing a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the Indian 
child’s family, with a focus on safe reunification as the most desirable goal.” 
 
Some question the viability of the ICWA given that consideration of race in matters 
of public decision-making is restricted, and ask how the ICWA squares with the 
Multiethnic Placement Act and the Interethnic Adoption Provisions. The basic answer is 
that tribes are sovereign nations, and enrollment in a tribe constitutes a political 
designation rather than a racial or ethnic classification.  
In response to the enactment of the ICWA, several states—e.g., Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota—have enacted comparable statutes at the state level. These statutes may be 
more expansive or protective than the federal law, and therefore may apply to children 
and families that would not be covered under the federal ICWA.  
 
 
APPLICATION OF DISABILITY LAW TO CHILD WELFARE CASES: THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND SIMILAR LAWS 
 
The services provided in child welfare cases to prevent the removal of a child from a 
parent’s custody or to reunify a family often are designed to address parenting problems 
identified by the child welfare agency. These problems with parenting may be the ones 
that prompted agency involvement in the first place or may be ongoing or new concerns 
that contribute to continued foster care placement. In contrast, less attention may be paid 
to the social service and educational needs of children involved in the child protection 
system. Child welfare agencies need to carefully ascertain what kinds of assistance 
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children may require, and special attention must be paid to ensuring that the needs of 
children with disabilities are met.  
It is well-established that any services provided to parents by child welfare and 
associated agencies must reasonably accommodate a parent’s disability under Title II of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (26). If these services do not reasonably 
accommodate a parent’s disability, they may not be considered “reasonable efforts” by 
the courts, jeopardizing the state’s access to federal funding in that case and potentially 
interfering with later efforts by the agency to terminate the parent’s rights. Similarly, but 
perhaps considered less frequently by child welfare agencies and the service providers 
with whom they work, the ADA also protects children with disabilities. Therefore, any 
services provided to a child with a disability must accommodate that disability such that 
the child has an opportunity to benefit from the service as much as a non-disabled child 
might. 
The ADA is a federal civil rights law that is designed “to provide clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities” (27). It is not the only law to do so. For example, Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also addresses disability discrimination, but only in entities 
that receive federal funding (28). Many organizations and agencies providing services to 
children in the child welfare system receive federal funds, so Section 504 would apply to 
them much as the ADA does. So too would analogous state disability rights statutes 
where they exist. Because the application is quite similar between these statutes, and the 
ADA is the more encompassing federal law, this chapter focuses on how the ADA 
applies in these cases. Readers should simply be mindful that other disability rights laws 
are likely to apply as well. 
APPLICATION OF THE ADA 
The threshold for whether the ADA applies to a child in a given child welfare case is 
whether the child has a disability. Disability is defined as “(A) a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [the] individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment”
(29). Whether a person is disabled is to “be construed in favor of broad coverage” (30). 
The statute provides a non-exhaustive list of many “major life activities,” both physical 
and cognitive, that may be limited and therefore fall under the Act (31). These include 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, and communicating, all tasks that are germane 
in educational and other contexts, such as psychotherapy and health care, in which 
children may engage. Impairments in these and other areas of functioning may interfere 
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with a child’s ability to benefit from services provided by child welfare and other 
agencies if reasonable accommodations are not made. 
Unless the agency will stipulate to the fact that a child is disabled or has portrayed 
the child as disabled in its court pleadings or other documents or verbal statements, 
evidence of disability will be needed to trigger ADA protections. This evidence may 
include information from medical and mental health evaluation reports or other records, 
Social Security determinations, or educational evaluations and records. Although child 
welfare agencies frequently describe disabling impairments in parents, it is less common 
for them to note how the child functions in different domains. Therefore, practitioners 
should not rely on the agency to “tip them off” to a child’s disability, and thorough 
evaluation of the child is a critical component of ensuring that any disabilities are 
identified and accommodated. 
Sometimes, however, the agency does report that the child has a disability or 
describes the child’s functional status in a way that implies that it regards the child as 
disabled. In these cases, the ADA applies. Under the ADA, disability may be inferred if a 
person is treated by a public entity as having an impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity (32). In essence, this treatment by the agency amounts to the child 
being regarded as having an impairment, thereby triggering ADA protections. 
In order to be eligible for ADA protection, the child must be a “qualified individual 
with a disability,” which is defined as a person who, “with or without reasonable 
modifications,” “meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or 
the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity” (33). There is no 
doubt that children with disabilities who are involved in child welfare proceedings are 
eligible to receive services from the agency and are therefore qualified individuals under 
the ADA. Finally, child welfare agencies are clearly public entities, including private 
agencies that enter into contracts with the state or county child welfare agency to do work 
that would otherwise fall to the public agency. Therefore, they are required to follow the 
requirements of the ADA. It is important to note that the ADA applies to child protection 
agencies regardless of whether the case is court-involved. Child welfare agencies take 
only a small fraction of cases to court, mostly when children must be removed from the 
custody of their parents. Many cases are handled by the agency directly with the families 
involved and never go to court, and in all of these matters, the agency must comply with 
the ADA. Therefore, the agency must accommodate the disabilities of the parents and 
children with whom they work, from ensuring accessibility to agency and other facilities 
to providing any educational materials in an accessible format and using training 
approaches tailored to the needs of the individual. 
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DEVELOPING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS 
 
When reasonable accommodations are required in order to meet the needs of a child with 
a disability who is receiving services, it is important to think carefully about exactly what 
kinds of accommodations might be in order. That determination may rely on having a 
thorough assessment, which may need to be a multidisciplinary assessment, of the child’s 
needs. That assessment should take a “functional” view of disability. The functional view 
emphasizes the child’s actual, functional abilities across whatever domains are relevant 
(34). Therefore, a functional evaluation may reveal how the child learns best or applies 
what he or she learns, or how the child navigates the word physically, or the child’s 
behaviors in various circumstances, and the like. In addition, the functional perspective 
emphasizes the interaction of the individual and his or her environment, recognizing that 
the environment itself, including not only physical barriers but also policies, attitudes, 
and teaching styles, can be disabling or contribute to diminished functioning (35). A 
functional approach provides the most guidance in planning interventions, including how 
best to accommodate the disability.  
In contrast, a “categorical” view of disability emphasizes the criteria for various 
categories of disability, such as a type of mental illness, intellectual disability, or a 
specific physical disability, much like a medical diagnosis. (34) The categorical approach 
reveals little about the person’s actual functioning and thus provides scant information for 
the purpose of service planning and reasonable accommodations. Unfortunately, many 
professionals are tempted to approach disabilities categorically, because it is easier to 
diagnose and label than it is to do a deeper, more meaningful assessment. Over-reliance 
on the categorical approach contributes to service provision that is not tailored to the 
actual needs of the individual. 
Given the complexities of disability coupled with the trauma history that is inherent 
to most child protection cases, the gold standard for an assessment that is likely to result 
in excellent service planning tailored to the child’s needs is multidisciplinary, trauma-
informed assessment completed by a team that has expertise in working with children 
with disabilities. These types of evaluation can yield rich data that effectively guide 
interventions across the medical, mental health, and educational spectra. When 
considering reasonable accommodations, there are no set approaches, and it is best to 
consult with the child if he or she is old enough, his or her parents, providers who may 
have worked with the child in the school, medical, and mental health contexts, and expert 
evaluators in order to determine what accommodations may be needed.  
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SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 
 
It is critical to consider the educational needs for every child in the child welfare system, 
and children with disabilities may encounter extra challenges in school. They also are 
supposed to receive specific protections. Children with disabilities are legally entitled to 
receive a “free, appropriate public education” (FAPE), and the special education system 
is intended to provide them with just that (36). The Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) is the main federal law that governs the provision of special 
education services, though the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
can be useful as well. A special education program is deemed appropriate if it was 
created through an Individualized Education Program (IEP) process and is reasonably 
calculated to confer educational benefit (37). Through special education, children with 
disabilities can receive specialized instruction, adapted transportation to and from school, 
various therapies, and a wide range of supplementary aids and services, including 
assistive technology devices, to the extent that any of these services are needed in order 
for the child to receive a FAPE (38). 
Generally, education rights flow through the parents of children, not the children 
themselves. If a child with a disability remains with his or her parent during the pendency 
of a child welfare case, the parent can seek special education services for the child. 
Assistance from the child welfare agency in doing so may be necessary and appropriate, 
but the caseworker cannot sign an IEP. If a child is in foster care, a parent can still seek 
special education services, as can a foster parent (39). In addition, the court may 
designate an educational surrogate for the purposes of special education planning if a 
child is a court ward (40). 
A written referral indicating that a student may need special education services 
begins the process. School personnel may write these referrals, as can parents, guardians, 
or foster parents. The referral triggers an evaluation to determine the child’s eligibility. 
Special education evaluations must be designed to assess both the student’s eligibility and 
the student’s educational needs in order to inform what services should be put into place 
(41). IDEA has numerous eligibility categories, such as cognitive impairment, specific 
learning disability, speech and language impairment, etc., but it is important to note that 
the category does not determine or limit what services the child might receive (42). 
Rather, the category simply makes the child eligible for all necessary services to benefit 
from his or her education. Therefore, advocates and caregivers should consider the 
eligibility category merely as a means of entry into the special education system. Once a 
parent or other caregiver consents to an evaluation, the school district has sixty calendar 
days or less to complete it (43). 
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Once an evaluation is completed, an Individualized Education Planning Team (IEPT) 
is convened to determine the student’s eligibility for special education services based on 
the evaluation. As noted above, if a student is eligible for special education services, an 
Individualized Education Program (IEP) must be developed by the IEPT (44). The IEP 
must be reassessed at least yearly, and either the school or parent can request that an IEP 
meeting be held sooner if needed. The child must be educated in the least restrictive 
environment that is appropriate to meet his or her needs (45). The IEP should indicate the 
settings in which services will occur, exactly what services will be provided, how long 
and how often services will be provided, the student’s current level of functioning, how 
progress will be measured, and any supplementary aids or services that are necessary for 
the student to receive a FAPE. The goals for what the student is expected to achieve in 
the following year should be clear, objective, and measurable. Special education students 
must be included in state educational testing, albeit with accommodations, or in alternate 
assessments if they cannot participate in state educational testing even with 
accommodations (46).  
For children in foster care, all of this may be more difficult to accomplish, especially 
if the child has changed schools. If the parent is uninvolved, there may be a dearth of 
background knowledge about the child and his or her educational programming, even if 
the school has up to date records. Agency personnel and the child’s lawyer should 
endeavor to bridge any gaps, which may include arranging for school personnel from the 
child’s previous school to attend an IEP meeting and consult with the new school in an 
ongoing manner. Another option may be to advocate for a thorough re-evaluation. 
Finally, caregivers and advocates should be aware that while IDEA is the primary 
legal scheme under which special education services are provided, some children with 
disabilities do not qualify under IDEA’s eligibility categories. In such cases, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation may still mandate 
that the school accommodate the child’s disability. It is important to consult with a 
student advocacy center or with the state’s Protection and Advocacy office for 
representation or advice about how to access special education services or other 






Children with disabilities may be eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
payments from the Social Security Administration. For SSI purposes, a child is 
considered disabled if he or she is under 18 years of age and “has a medically 
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determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe 
functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months” (47). If the 
child is in foster care, SSI payments will go to the child welfare agency to offset the cost 
of the child’s care. Despite the fact that such payments might not appear to benefit the 
child directly, it is important to apply for SSI benefits if the child might be eligible. The 
child’s disability may require ongoing financial support beyond the time that the child is 
in foster care, and either the child’s family of origin or the child’s adoptive family could 
benefit substantially from SSI payments, materially improving the child’s standard of 
living. If a child is in foster care, the child welfare agency should apply for SSI benefits 
on the child’s behalf.  
To determine whether the child is disabled and therefore eligible for SSI benefits, 
Social Security requires detailed information about the child’s condition and how it 
affects his or her functioning in daily life, including at home, in school, and in other 
contexts. Reports or other data from doctors, therapists, teachers, etc., also provide 
information for the eligibility determination. Unfortunately, it may be difficult to gather 
adequate medical and school records for children in foster care, especially if they have 
changed schools or providers and records have not transferred successfully, but it is 
important to try to do so. Also, the income and resources of the child’s household will be 
considered in the SSI eligibility determination—if income and resources are more than 
the allowed amount, the child will not be eligible for SSI payments. However, this 





It is inevitable that some children with disabilities will come to the attention of child 
protection authorities or that maltreated children will become disabled. This chapter has 
addressed the legal framework for addressing the needs of children when these two 
phenomena intersect. It has summarized the constitutional framework governing 
relationships between parents, child, and the state and provided an overview of important 
federal child protection and disability law. It is essential that child welfare agency 
caseworkers, lawyers, and other professionals consider a child’s disability in the course 
of a child protection case and seek expert consultation as necessary so as to ensure that 
children’s needs are met. 
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